The paper presents two generic fault detection and isolation (FDI) techniques which have shown remarkable robustness when applied to the SIMULINK model of a small satellite for thruster failures. While fundamentally di¨erent in their design approach, they both generate ¢struc-tured residuals£ which accurately capture the failure mode. The diagnosis criterion in both methods relies on residuals direction rather than magnitude, which avoids the delays and expense of setting accurate thresholds for residuals magnitudes. Most importantly, this fact can account for the enhanced robustness to disturbances and sensor noise, as well as to signi¦cant parametric variations. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations are presented validating the robust performance of the two algorithms.
INTRODUCTION
Analytic redundancy methods have been prevalent for FDI and have resulted in improved performance(s) with considerably lower costs. Naturally, the majority are all model-based and, consequently, their performance is directly a¨ected by the quality of model ¦delity, and further in §uenced by the disturbances and sensor noise of the overall system. Consequently, such methods need to be designed with signi¦cant ¢built-in£ robustness properties, if false alarms or missed detections are to be avoided and, further, failure identi¦cation and its associated severity accurately achieved. This requirement becomes imperative in critical space missions, where both time and accuracy are of the essence, particularly where autonomy is involved.
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS, AND OBJECTIVES

Satellite System Engineering Characteristics and Requirements
As it currently stands, the overall satellite design model consists of three subloops for which corresponding controllers have been designed separately, assuming noninteraction between the loop dynamics. These are:
(1) the drag free loop;
(2) the attitude dynamics loop; and (3) the suspension loop, with the eight thrusters in the drag free loop serving as actuators. This is the system for which robust FDI algorithms were designed, tested, and validated in its SIMULINK model, with the additional requirements that they should be nonintrusive and not interfere with the rest of the overall system function. Thus, the FDI has to function independently, as a ¢plug in£ on the overall system. Although loop independence was assumed in the controller design stage, the fact is that the drag free and attitude control loops are strongly coupled, with the drag free serving as the ¢inner loop,£ due to its faster dynamics between the two. There is also coupling from these two to the suspension loop but not vice versa [4, 8] . The controllers have been designed using the ¢loop by loop approach,£ which hinges on the assumption of ¢no coupling£ between the individual loops. Because of this ¢nonideality£ in the controller design, it is possible that the interaction between the loops can exacerbate the disturbance e¨ects [9, 10] . In fact, there is no guarantee that, even if ¢individual loop constraints£ are met, the overall system behavior will retain these characteristics in its integrated multiloop function. Because of these di©culties, to quote [8] , ¢only drag free and suspension measurements are selected for FDI because of their low noise characteristics.£ Consequently, the methods where FDI is predicated solely on residuals magnitude, rather than direction, can be particularly sensitive to these e¨ects, as they cannot be accurately estimated. On the other hand, the methods that rely on residuals direction rather than magnitude, for failure diagnosis, are practically immune to such e¨ects and, therefore, do not require any additional signal conditioning, thus keeping the implementation issues much simpler.
The two methods presented in this paper precisely subscribe to this, though their design concept and approach are fundamentally di¨erent. The ¦rst, known as the ¢Diagnosis Filter£ (DF), is totally deterministic in its approach, while the second is stochastic, based on the H 2 optimization mathematics for ¦lter design.
Fault Detection and Isolation Objectives
The primary objective of the project was to design robust failure detection algorithms for the thruster (actuator) failures using model-based schemes. These use a dynamical model (of the plant) to detect the actuator failures. If an actuator fails, then its e¨ect: (i) can be ¢observed£ by an anomaly in the vehicle dynamics, which (ii) are observed via sensor measurements.
If one allows for both sensor and actuator failures, then the task of failure identi¦cation and isolation becomes much more complex. However, advanced detection theory [4, 7, 11] can indeed handle both eventualities, at the expense of additional computation. For the present project, however, it is assumed that only actuator failures occur, while the sensors function is normal at all times.
In the present reference application, much like in the MEX (Mars Express), there are eight thrusters which are arranged in a classical con¦guration in two separate branches of four thrusters each [8] . The thrusters are arranged to control the high level disturbing torque of the main engine; only four thrusters are used in a nominal situation.
Both methods developed can readily and naturally encompass not only actuator failures but also sensor failures as well as certain uncertainties (parametric) in the dynamics in the same structural model, without necessarily an increase in dimensionality, i. e., construction of additional DFs or H 2 -based ¦lters; this depends only on the speci¦c system topology, which may allow for all faults to be detected by one ¦lter only.
The FDI objectives then, for this study, are the following:
identify a failed thruster in any mode, whether in the eight or four thruster mode, in any con¦guration; and pin-point thruster failure severity.
This capability, to identify, online, in real time, any of the eight thruster failures, occurring at any time interval of system operation, with any failure severity and a wide range of fault pro¦les, and with remarkable robustness, is precisely the contribution of the presently completed work.
Types of Faults Considered
The thrusters can be functioning perfectly (open) or have a failure (closed). Thus, the model of a thruster fault in the satellite simulator is: Identifying the thruster e¨ectiveness factor δ, or its complement γ, which represents the failure severity, has been analytically addressed in [6] . If δ is constant, then its complement represents a ¦xed percentage degradation in thruster function. However, the parameter δ need not be constant or intermittently constant. Leakages can also be represented by appropriate functional representations of the parameter like, for example,
where α signi¦es the leakage rate which can be set to a very low value. For example, for α = 0.0001, the thruster e¨ectiveness is almost 100% at the start and is reduced to 99% at t = 100 s. This, then, means that a very slow leakage is present in the thruster. Other functional representations are possible as well for various other modes of failure, such as ¢linear degradation£ of a thruster function, etc. In both design methods, once a thruster failure has been isolated, the failure severity can subsequently be identi¦ed via a simple identi¦cation procedure as described in [6] . This is possible to be done whether δ is constant or time varying. The standard evaluation criteria apply:
false alarm rate r fa ; missed detection rate r md ; correct isolation rate r ic ; wrong isolation rate r iw ; time to detection t d ; and time to achieve isolation t i .
FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION METHODOLOGY
Residuals direction, rather than magnitude, o¨ers a much more robust diagnosis criterion, as ¢direction£ is much less sensitive to (small) parametric uncertainty ¡ in the present satellite application, up to ±20% ¡ and cannot easily be a¨ected by random noise, which is not typically contained in any speci¦c direction and, therefore, is not bound to exclusively ¢disturb£ any one direction alone. In contrast, residuals magnitude is directly a¨ected by noise and modeling inaccuracies regardless and, although it is much easier to handle analytically, it is a much more conservative measure and much less robust to both structured and unstructured uncertainty. This is why disturbance estimation and accurate threshold setting is invariably needed in most of the available algorithms, in order to minimize false alarms, while a directionality diagnostic criterion has no such requirements. Indeed, direction captures phase information and is a much more accurate and robust measure to use. So, a method that employs a ¢residual direction£ diagnostic criterion for FDI is preferable to methods that use a ¢residual magnitude£ criterion.
Design Method 1: Diagnosis Filter
The DF relies on ¢system fault controllability,£ that is, it assumes that the component failure ¡ actuator or sensor and, speci¦cally, thrusters in the present case, ¡ a¨ects the system response (state) and is also re §ected in the system response measurements (output observability). Thus, its development hinges on appropriately ¢tracing£ and ¢transforming£ such ¢fault controllability£ and ¢observ-ability£ subspaces by designing the DF gain matrix such that each fault direction, as processed through the system, has in the end a unique and invariant re §ection in the residual direction. Thus, the DF is not only able to detect a failure, but also to identify it automatically, as its resulting residual assumes a prespeci¦ed failure direction, which has been appropriately transformed in the course of the design process based on the system observability and controllability characteristics. In some cases, if the model structure allows, and this also depends on the available measurements, just one DF can be employed to detect all possible failures. Even if the design model topology for the plant does not always allow for the coverage of all failures with just one ¦lter, as outlined in [11] , a second one usually completes the set of all failures that can be identi¦ed. All such ¦lters have identical structure; however, each individual one has a di¨erent gain matrix that satis¦es the structured residual directionality conditions that correspond to the failure directions it is designed for. The basic principles of the theoretical development FAULT DETECTION AND CONTROL of the DF are as in the simple construct below, which explains residual generation, analytic redundancy, and directionality relations, all basic ingredients of the DF.
Residuals generation and analytic redundancy
In the context of failure detection, a residual is a function of time which is nominally zero or close to zero when no failure is present, but is distinguishably di¨erent from zero when a component of the system fails. For example, the di¨erence between the outputs of two identical sensors measuring the same quantity is the simplest form of a residual, with no dynamics interjected in between. The process of generating the residuals from relationships among instantaneous outputs of sensors is usually called direct redundancy. However, it is also possible to generate the residuals using temporal redundancy, which is the process of exploiting the (dynamic) relationship among the sensor outputs and actuator inputs. This requires a ¢hypothesized£ model of the dynamics of the system to relate sensor outputs and actuator inputs at di¨erent instants of time.
A simple typical ¦rst-order discrete system serves as an illustrative example. Let consider the following:
y(t) = cx(t) .
If the system is functioning properly and no failure is present, then a simple computation shows:
Relations like the above are known as generalized parity relations. A parity relation by itself is used to generate a residual r(t). In the above example, simply take
Assuming the actuator is perfect and no measurement noise is present, a nonzero r(t) indicates a sensor failure.
Analogously, in the case of actuator failure, assuming the sensor is perfect, a nonzero r(t) indicates an actuator fault.
Full state observers (FSO) are another class of processors which use temporal redundancy to generate the residuals. Consider, for example, the following linear time invariant (LTI) system with two actuator inputs:
PROGRESS IN FLIGHT DYNAMICS, GNC, AND AVIONICS
The term B 1 m 1 (t) characterizes a failure of the ¦rst actuator, while B 2 m 2 (t) of the second.The functions m i (t) are assumed to be completely unknown, with m i (t) = 0 if there is no failure present. Next, let design a full-order observer:
When a failure is present, the innovation z(t) − y(t) will start to grow and, by placing a threshold on the magnitude of the innovation, one can detect the presence of a failure in the system. Or, preferably, as is the case in Design Method 1 (DM1), if the innovation direction is aligned with a (failed) actuator/sensor direction, then one can detect a failure in the corresponding actuator/sensor.
Next, through appropriate choice of the gain matrix D, in conjunction with linear transformations on the innovation/residuals, the latter can be constrained to have a ¦xed direction in the output space and, in fact, lie in independent subspaces for di¨erent actuator failures. In particular, de¦ning two linear transformations on the innovation, r 1 (t) and r 2 (t), as follows:
matrices D, H 1 , and H 2 can be found such that the failure of the ¦rst actuator shows up in r 1 (t) but has no e¨ect on r 2 (t) and, analogously, for the failure of the second actuator. Clearly, if the innovation growth is constrained to independent subspaces, then H 1 and H 2 can simply be taken as the projection matrices onto these subspaces.
From elementary system theory, for a nonzero m 2 (t) not to a¨ect r 1 (t), the image of B 2 should be in the unobservable subspace of the system (H 1 C, A + DC). Also, for a nonzero m 1 to show up in r 1 , the image of B 1 should not intersect the unobservable subspace of (H 1 C, A + DC). Analogously, for the unobservable subspace of (H 2 C, A + DC). The problem, therefore, is to use the freedom in assigning the eigenvectors of A + DC to satisfy the failure detection and identi¦cation requirements. This method hinges on the linearity of plant dynamics and is not easily extendable to nonlinear models.
Design Method 2: H 2 -Based Filter
Here, ¢structured residuals£ generation is not incorporated in the DF design at the outset but, rather, directionality was ¢recovered£ via an adjoint operation on the optimal H 2 ¦lter residuals. In the H 2 -based ¦lter, separation of ¢geometry£ and ¢dynamics£ is a key feature: an H 2 ¦lter in conjunction with a residuals failure direction recovery and subsequent projection algorithm onto the speci¦c thruster failure directions.
The residuals direction recovery process here is key and a unique feature of the present algorithm, which allows for the residuals direction and not the magnitude to be used for fault diagnosis. Thus, the new design synthesis combines the desirable FDI robustness features of DM1 along with those that naturally arise in an H 2 design framework: the guaranteed stability of the overall residual dynamics, unlike the case in DM1, and the optimal disturbance and sensor noise rejection inherent in the design. This latter feature allows for considerable simpli¦cation of the veri¦cation and validation process.
For this design, the plant dynamics are described by:
where b i are the (thruster) failure directions, corresponding to the columns of the B matrix here, and n i (t) are their magnitudes which are unknown. Let note here that, unlike in the case of the DF [11] , the plant dynamics include the presence of (stochastic) disturbances ξ(t) and the output contains measurement noise θ(t).
In this second algorithm, these are explicitly considered in the ¦lter design, and this constitutes a fundamental di¨erence in the design procedure from the previous one which was carried out in a ¢deterministic setting.£ Next, let set up a type of UIO, or ¦lter, of the form:
Note that the ¦lter is designed according to the unfailed plant model dynamics. Given the above mathematical descriptions, the residual dynamics are governed by the following equations, obtained by subtracting Eq. (2) from Eq. (1):
r(t) = y(t) − y(t) = C " x(t) + θ(t)
where " x = x − x is the ¢estimation error.£ The residual dynamics have essentially the same structure as in the case of the DF in DM1, except for the two additional terms, Lξ(t) + Gθ(t), for disturbances and sensor noise. Also, the mathematical derivation of the ¦lter gain matrix, G, is di¨erent, according to the H 2 norm. Directionality information of the residuals is ¢recovered£ by essentially an adjoint operation and projection onto the controllable subspaces of the failure directions, in order to be used for FDI. Thus, this new method, also, uses direction rather than magnitude, of the appropriately transformed residuals, as FDI diagnostic. The direction remains close to invariant because of the dominance of the failure direction in the plant dynamics and in the residual as well. This is not so with the magnitude, which directly re §ects very substantively the e¨ect of all ¢noise and uncertainty£ factors and is, therefore, much more vulnerable to them.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Testing of the Diagnosis Filter ¡ Design Method 1
Establishing algorithm performance limits in o¨-nominal conditions
The complete DM1 algorithm was ¦rst run extensively to establish maximum total noise levels and minimum severity magnitudes that can be correctly identi¦ed. The results are summarized as follows.
For minimum constant failure of magnitude 1 total failure, the maximum tolerated Noise Factor (NF) is 10,000; minimum constant failure of 0.0001 ¡ maximum NF = 1; minimum constant failure of 0.1 ¡ maximum NF = 1000; minimum constant failure of 0.01 ¡ maximum NF = 100; and minimum constant failure of 0.001 ¡ maximum NF = 10.
Also, the combinations of minimum leakage (slope) vs. maximum noise that could be identi¦ed have been tested extensively. In fact, the parameter a in the presented leakage model ranged from 0.0001 and up, with 0.0001 representing a leakage of 0.01 after 100 s. The results are as follows: minimum leakage rate 0.001 ¡ maximum NF = 1; minimum leakage rate 0.01 ¡ maximum NF = 10; and minimum leakage rate 0.1 ¡ maximum NF = 100.
The maximum NF in the above is simply a ¢scaling factor£ from the nominal value of one (Simulator level normalized) and upwards and includes noise from all sources, both disturbances as well as sensor noise. It is also worth noting that, given that FDI occurs under reasonable NF conditions (NF = 10) in the vast majority of cases in less than 50 s, with mean time to FDI at less than 10 s, this means that, indeed, DM1 is able to identify a very slow leakage, reaching less than 0.005 magnitude at the time of identi¦cation. Intermittent failures of very small magnitude were also tested with the same success. This is attributable to the fact that FDI is achieved within just a few seconds or, in some cases, a fraction of a second, a time interval which is much shorter normally than the timing cycle of intermittent failures. Indeed, as the extensive simulations have shown, the DM1 exhibits excellent performance and robustness to dramatically enhanced noise and minimal severity and leakage rate magnitudes.
FAULT DETECTION AND CONTROL
Sensitivity and robustness results ¡ Monte Carlo simulations
As also reported in [1] , the most important contributors to enhanced sensitivity and reduced robustness are: thrusters misalignments that are directly translated into the in §uence matrix of the thrusters on spacecraft acceleration; the center of mass of the spacecraft; and suspension and drag free sti¨ness.
The Monte Carlo Simulation Framework
The Monte Carlo Simulation framework was essentially the entire SIMULINK realization of the FDI algorithms, complete with the severity identi¦cation module, where parameters were chosen to change randomly and simultaneously, and where the noise factors were also varied. Four sets of 10,000 point Monte Carlo simulations were run:
(1) random up to ±10 percent misalignment, which corresponds to up to 3.6
• , and ±10 percent variation in center of mass and suspension and drag free sti¨ness (for each sti¨ness and on each axis) with a noise factor of 10;
(2) random up to ±10 percent misalignment, which corresponds to up to 3.6
• , and ±10 percent variation in center of mass (nominal value d * = 0.376) and suspension and drag free sti¨ness with a noise factor of 100; (3) random up to ±20 percent misalignment, which corresponds to up to 7.2
• , and ±20 percent variation in center of mass and suspension and drag free sti¨ness (for each sti¨ness and on each axis) with a noise factor of 100; and (4) random up to ±20 percent misalignment, which corresponds to up to 7.2
• , and ±20 percent variation in center of mass and suspension and drag free sti¨ness (for each sti¨ness and on each axis) with a noise factor of 1000.
Severity also varied randomly from 0.01 to 1, that is, failures from 1% to 100%. All eight thrusters were included.
Monte Carlo Results
1. In this case, which nonetheless represents a signi¦cant departure from nominal conditions, the results were perfect; absolutely 100% true detection and identi¦cation as well as accurate severity identi¦cation. 
Establishing algorithm performance limits in o¨-nominal conditions
The complete H 2 FDI algorithm was ¦rst run extensively to establish maximum total noise levels and minimum severity magnitudes that can be correctly identi¦ed. For constant failures of up to 0.01 severity (magnitude), the algorithm could tolerate up to a maximum NF of 1000, uniformly, for all failure magnitudes. Similarly, for leakage rates of 0.001 to 0.1, the algorithm tolerance was uniform for maximum NF of 100. It is worth noting that, given that FDI occurs under reasonable noise factor conditions (NF = 10) in most cases in less than 3 s, with mean time to FDI less than 2 s, this means that indeed the H 2 ¦lter is able to identify a very slow leakage, reaching less than 0.005 magnitude at the time of identi¦cation. Intermittent failures of very small magnitude were also tested with the same success. This is attributable to the fact that FDI is achieved within just a few seconds, a time interval which is much shorter normally than the timing cycle of intermittent failures. Indeed, as the extensive simulations have shown, the H 2 ¦lter exhibits excellent performance and robustness to dramatically enhanced noise and minimal severity and leakage rate magnitudes.
Here, also, the Monte Carlo simulation framework was exactly analogous to the testing of DM1. For this design, 6 sets of 10,000 point Monte Carlo simulations were run:
(1) nominal parameter settings, to establish a baseline performance, but with d = d * − 10% = 0.3384 and NF of 100; missed identi¦cation, all of which with severity 0.01. Again, here, the absolute value of severity was correctly identi¦ed, with negative severity ¢ §ag-ging£ missed identi¦cation. There were no false alarms and no missed detection.
4. Here, it was 100 percent true detection and 99.99 percent true identi¦cation and true severity magnitude identi¦cation. No false alarms; no missed detection. There was only one case of missed identi¦cation, with the negative severity ¢ §agging£ it.
5. In this case, again, it was 100 percent true detection and 99.81 percent true identi¦cation and true severity magnitude identi¦cation. No false alarms; no missed detection. The 19 cases of missed identi¦cation were again with severity magnitude of 0.01, identi¦ed with negative severity. The absolute value of the severity magnitude was correctly identi¦ed in all cases. Another interpretation of this would be to say that there were 19 cases of missed identi¦cation of a failed thruster that has, however, failed with a severity magnitude of 0.01.
6. In this ¦nal set of runs, 100 percent fault detection was achieved; yet true identi¦cation of the failed thruster was missed in 430 cases, of which 302 with negative severity.
However, both negative severity as well as positive severity were associated with missed identi¦cation here; there was no particular ¢ §agging£ signi¦cance to negative severity, due to the exacerbated NF. Here, the percentage of missed identi¦cation is 4.3%, which is also the percentage of missed severity identi¦cation. So, in this case, there were 95.7 percent true identi¦cation and also 95.7 percent correct severity magnitude identi¦cation. Also, it was noted that all these ¢missed£ cases were associated with very low severity magnitude, considering the level of NF. Severity was in the range [0.01 − 0.09], with only one case of 0.11. Here, the algorithm was not able to identify even just the absolute magnitude of the severity correctly; not surprising, given the dramatic increase of noise factor. The algorithm sensitivity to (very signi¦-cant) deviation of optimization parameters from design values is particularly pronounced here. The bottom line is, however, that even under these exacerbated circumstances, the FDI gives 100 percent true detection and no false alarms or missed detection.
The two sets of Monte Carlo runs (1) and (6) above, which are close to nominal except for d and the noise factor, clearly delineate the algorithm performance bounds with respect to noise increase from nominal which cannot exceed two orders of magnitude, if true detection alone is not the only objective. If, however, there are such circumstances of dramatically increased disturbances and sensor noise, the algorithm still detects 100% any thruster failure.
The timing to FDI is very similar for all 6 runs and mean time to FDI is lower than 2 s; this was indeed the ¦nding throughout the entire Monte Carlo simulation testing. This represents a factor of 5 improvement over DM1.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The H 2 ¦lter has worked remarkably well and considerably better than the DF, which also exhibited excellent performance. The H 2 ¦lter performance was perfect for noise factors up to 10 and its time to FDI much faster than that of the DF. Also, t d was fairly uniform throughout the test cases, marking rather small increases in the more challenging cases, relative to the simpler ones. This can, to some extent, be attributed to the fact that the H 2 ¦lter represents an optimal design and the one where the time constant can be directly in §uenced through the KFDE (Kalman Filter Domain Equality). The fact that it is a stochastic optimization based design, with noise characteristics explicitly taken into account in the design process, also explains its higher sensitivity to large noise factors; it did not perform for noise factors greater than 1000, unlike the DF, in which the noise parameters did not enter in the design process at all.
The marked performance superiority of the H 2 ¦lter is unquestionable, precisely because of its other desirable attributes, like guaranteed convergence, control over time to FDI, the fact that it is also simultaneously an optimal state estimator ¡ with obvious implications for closed loop/control operation and nonavailability of measurements ¡ and the fact that some of the most promising nonlinear estimation techniques use the 2-norm in their development. So, this FDI methodology could be readily adaptable to nonlinear FDI scenaria.
